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yim@fas.harvard.eduSocial networks among the agents in a market can affect the nature of financial 
transactions and their outcomes. When information is privately held, the specific links 
among market participants in the social network often determine who acquires 
information, when they obtain it, how to interpret its significance, and how to effectively 
deploy it. Here, we examine the vast network that selectively interconnects tens of 
thousands of members of boards of directors of domestic, publicly held corporations. The 
director “interlock” network arises because many company officers and directors serve 
on multiple boards, thus creating information pathways between specific pairs of 
corporate boards. This is exactly the type of network that we would anticipate will 
influence corporate governance-related outcomes; it connects important decision makers 
who often operate in an environment characterized by incomplete information.  
In this paper, we associate board “interlocks” with firms’ propensities to become 
targets in private-equity-backed, take-private transactions. The private equity industry has 
expanded rapidly in recent years. In 2006 and 2007 alone, $700B was invested in take-
private transactions of US public firms. Notwithstanding the market’s abrupt collapse in 
August 2007, the industry’s recent upsurge has been called a new wave of private equity, 
characterized by cheap debt, large inflows of capital, frequent auctions, the emergence of 
club deals, and a preponderance of friendly takeovers. However, despite the 
unprecedented scale of recent deals and their marked differences from those of the 1980s, 
the drivers of take-private activity have not been systematically examined in a broad 
sample of U.S. firms since research on the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s. In addition 
to presenting estimates of the effects of basic firm-level characteristics of private equity 
transactions, the recent backdrop of friendly deals offers a favorable context in which to 
  3study the influence of boards and the role of board interlocks, which we believe yield 
interesting insights into the role of social networks in corporate transactions.  
Corporate directors are key agents in all potential change of control transactions. 
With respect to private equity offers, boards may influence transaction probabilities 
through a number of mechanisms. First, because most recent private equity deals have 
been friendly, if directors oppose a private equity offer, behind-the-scenes discussions of 
a potential bid may never become public. Thus, a board’s opposition may cause the take-
private process to shutdown before public disclosure occurs. Second, directors may 
actively participate in off-the-record discussions that convey to private equity firms the 
openness of the companies they represent to take-private offers. Similarly, directors may 
be more or less open to the idea of management-initiated discussion about the possibility 
of a private equity deal. Third, viewed from the private equity side of the transaction, 
firms with certain director characteristics may, ceteris paribus, represent more appealing 
targets because the takeover process would be anticipated to occur efficiently or under 
more favorable terms.
1 Any or all of these factors would be sufficient to create an 
association between board characteristics and the probability that a firm becomes a target 
in a PE transaction. 
The most novel contribution of this paper is the examination of board interlocks 
in driving a firm’s hazard rate of receiving a PE-backed take-private offer (hereafter, “PE 
Tx”), presumably by influencing a director’s disposition toward adopting a pro-PE 
stance. Two firms are said to be interlocked if, either concurrently or at different points in 
time, their boards share a common director. In 2007, approximately 85% of public firms 
                                                 
1 In conversations with partners at private equity firms, we were explicitly told that potential transactions 
with experienced, knowledgeable, and “professional” directors were viewed more favorably than the 
alternative. 
  4were interlocked with at least one other company. Within the complete set of director 
interlocks, we take a subset of linkages and create a dummy variable “PE Link” at the 
firm/board level, which equals one when a given firm has one or more directors with 
links to past take-private experience. For example, Eugene Davis sat on the board of 
Metals USA in 2005 when it received a take private offer from Apollo Management. Mr. 
Davis also served on the board of Knology Inc from 2004-2007. In 2006 and 2007, 
Knology would have PE Link=1, due to the relationship it has with the Metals USA 
buyout via Mr. Davis. 
Following a large literature in sociology and a growing one in finance and 
economics, we believe that director interlocks create information pathways between 
firms. These links may lower the cost of acquiring information pertinent to the take 
private process. For instance, PE-linked directors of an at-risk firm will have existing 
relationships with attorneys, bankers, members of private equity firms, and other 
individuals whose services may be required in the take private process. Depending on 
their previous experiences, PE-linked directors also may be well positioned to assess the 
terms of a potential transaction, the reputation of the private equity firm, the chance that 
an initiated transaction will be completed successfully, and so on. Moreover, interlocked 
directors may be particularly influential on their respective boards. The relevance of this 
influence is that interlocked directors’ views on whether to consider a change of control 
transaction and what alternative would be most favorable may garner the greatest weight 
in boardroom deliberations. In other words, insofar as board-level decisions emerge from 
an intra-board influence process, we anticipate that interlocked directors with private 
  5equity experience will exert the strongest “peer effects” in boardroom deliberations about 
these transactions.  
Our results support the core hypothesis about linkages to past take private deals. 
We find that firms with one or more directors who have experienced a private equity 
transaction at another firm at which they were a director or officer are, depending upon 
the specification, 30-40% more likely to become take-private targets.  
We conduct an array of supplemental analyses to address alternative explanations. 
Two salient stories for PE Link immediately come to mind. First, the result may reflect a 
reverse causal process by which management teams that favor a private equity transaction 
recruit directors with PE experience to their boards. Second, it is undoubtedly the case 
that directors and firms match to each other on many characteristics, which raises the 
possibility that an unobserved variable may drive both PE Link and PE Tx. Regarding the 
first concern, we find that PE Link holds for long-seated directors who are unlikely to be 
placed on the board by management for the purpose of facilitating a private equity deal. 
Similarly, we find that the PE Link holds when we consider only the influence of 
directors who held positions on the board of a given at-risk firm since a date that 
preceded the time when they gained PE experience through a second directorship. With 
respect to possible omitted variables, we find that PE Link holds after controlling for 
numerous characteristics that could induce the observed matching between firms and 
directors; that the timing of PE Link activation within a firm matters; and that having a 
PE-experienced director matters most when the individual director that creates the 
interlock is influential and has had a positive prior PE experience. The latter results 
suggest that the interlocked director himself has an influence on the outcome, rather than 
  6the effect being driven solely by an omitted characteristic. Considered collectively, we 
believe these findings support the view that boards play an important role in PE 
transactions, and that in particular, the board network serves as a conduit for the 
transmission of experience and influence that meaningfully affects financial transactions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the related streams of 
literature and provides some background on the private equity process. Section 2 
describes the data and summary statistics. Section 3 provides baseline results on the 
drivers of PE offers and provides estimates of the interlock effect. Section 4 addresses 
potential alternative explanations in interpreting the interlock effect. Section 5 presents 
additional analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Background and Literature Review 
 
The Private Equity Process. In the typical, friendly private equity deal, 
representatives from the private equity firm and target management engage in informal 
talks to assess mutual interest in the deal. Participants on both sides of these transactions 
describe an active role of social networks in generating leads for potential PE deals. For 
instance, conversations with industry veterans revealed that important sources of deal 
leads were specific contacts at region- and industry-specialized investment banks (in 
addition to the large Wall Street banks), as well as executives with whom they had prior 
(professional or social) relationships.  
In the early stages of negotiations between management and PE principals, the 
board (in cases in which it is not involved from the beginning) is informed of talks and is 
  7updated on negotiation proceedings. The board will often then hire its own financial and 
legal counsel and form a special committee comprised of independent directors to 
evaluate the deal. The merger agreement then will require board approval before it can be 
sent out to shareholders via proxy; the actual vote then takes place at a special 
shareholder meeting called for the purpose. Thus, although shareholders have the final 
vote and management is often the initial contact for negotiations, board approval is a 
critical step in the completion of a private equity transaction. The alternative to a friendly 
deal for an acquirer is to go directly to the shareholders via a tender offer, but this is 
costly due to legal filing fees, mailing costs, defensive tactics by the board, and the risk 
of attracting competing bidders.
2 
 
Propensity to Become a PE Target. Hostile takeovers were the norm in the deals 
of the 1980s, which have been the main focus of the existing literature on the drivers of 
private equity transactions. The papers on 1980s LBOs primarily examined the free cash 
flow and undervaluation hypotheses of take private transactions (Lehn and Poulsen 1988; 
Opler and Titman 1993; Kieschnick 1998; Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg 1999). 
The handful of papers focusing on more recent deals have added ownership structure and 
firm visibility (i.e. analyst coverage, share liquidity) as potential determinants of going 
private activity. In a sample with 95 UK deals in 1998-2000, Weir, Laing, and Wright 
(2005) find that CEO and institutional ownership positively related to the likelihood of 
going private. Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, and van Dijk (2007) use a multinomial logit 
                                                 
2 In addition to the higher cost of completing a hostile bid, members of three of the largest PE firms told us 
that their private placement memoranda specifically prohibit the partnership from pursuing hostile buyout 
offers. Thus anecdotal result is consistent with the fact that only 2% of the transactions in the data were 
hostile deals. 
  8framework in a sample of 212 UK deals, 1997-2003, to study the comparative drivers of 
MBOs versus PE-backed deals. They find that both MBOs and PE deals are undervalued; 
low analyst coverage predicts only MBOs; and that executive ownership drives both 
MBOs and PE deals but that institutional ownership only drives PE deals.  
The more recent papers have focused on UK deals (primarily due to the 
availability of comprehensive UK transaction data from the Centre for Management 
Buyout Research), and none have studied the very recent period of private equity activity, 
which only peaked in 2006 to 2007. In contrast, our analysis focuses on US deals in the 
post-2000 period. Given that the nature of private equity activity has undergone 
substantial changes since the 1980s and the area of US deals has not been recently 
revisited, we expect a set of baseline estimates that provide a more relevant and timely 
picture of the drivers of US private equity activity. We also contribute to this literature by 
examining the role of social networks as a correlate of PE activity. 
 
Networks in Markets. The study of board interlocks in particular and social 
networks more generally has been pioneered by sociologists. Since the late 1970s, 
sociologists have studied the interfirm connections that are created when the same 
individual director either simultaneously or sequentially serves on the boards of multiple 
companies (e.g., Useem 1984; Mizruchi 1992). For example, Davis (1991) shows that the 
decision to adopt poison pills is correlated with director interlocks—anti-takeover 
defenses appear to have diffused across director-interlocked boards in a predictable 
pattern. In a qualitative study, Khurana (2001) shows that directors search across the 
interlock network when identifying and doing diligence on potential CEO candidates.  
  9Financial economists recently have adopted some of the ideas and techniques of 
social network analysis to study the consequences of director connections for different 
market outcomes. Larcker, Richardson, Seary, and Tuna (2005) argue that personal 
relationships between CEOs and “independent” directors reduce the independence of 
boards. They employ a measure of path distances (the minimum number of 
intermediaries that are required to connect two agents) in the director network to assess 
the relational proximity between inside and outside directors on boards. Larcker et al. 
find that CEO compensation is higher in firms with relationally “cozy” boards. In an 
analysis of social networks in the boardroom of a large sample of French companies, 
Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) find that CEOs who were former civil servants were more 
likely to accumulate directorships (thus creating multiple firm-to-firm interlocks), but 
were also more likely to run less profitable firms and were less likely to be replaced for 
poor performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that independent directors that sit on 
multiple boards—so-called “busy directors—are associated with weak corporate 
governance, and boards dominated by such directors exhibit governance characteristics 
similar to that of insider-dominated boards.  
Beyond inter-firm board connections, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) study 
educational networks shared by mutual fund managers and the directors of the companies 
in their portfolio. They find that mutual fund managers perform better on investments 
when directors of their portfolio companies are members of their networks. They 
interpret their results as showing that network connections confer information advantages 
to fund managers. Other recent papers have shown that social networks affect investment 
choices and fund returns in venture capital (Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Hochberg, 
  10Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007), the availability of financing for real estate transactions 
(Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2003), and the governance structure of strategic alliance 
contracts (Robinson and Stuart 2007). Thus, social networks are known to influence 
transaction patterns and impact real financial outcomes in an array of settings.  
We contribute to the work on social networks in finance by examining one of the 
most important corporate outcomes: change of control decisions. Not only are board-level 
decisions critical in this process, we believe that inter-board relationships also have 
meaningful effects. In the remainder of the paper, our objectives are twofold: first, for a 
broad sample of firms, we present updated baseline estimates of the probability that a 
firm is targeted in a PE Tx; second, we connect the PE Tx propensity to the growing 
literature on social networks in financial markets.  
  
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
  
Sample of going private transactions. Our sample consists of 657 deals 
announced from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2007 and identified as “Going Private” 
transactions in Thomson’s SDC Platinum M&A database and Capital IQ.
3 We collected 
all transactions from both databases and deleted duplicate observations. These are US 
targets, which we could verify traded on the New York, American, or Nasdaq stock 
exchanges on the announcement date. Deals are categorized as “PE” if a private equity 
firm is part of the acquiring party, “MBO” if the deal is a  management-led buyout 
without private equity involvement, or “Other,” which includes financial buyers such as 
                                                 
3 This includes 21 transactions from SDC flagged as “LBO” but appropriately considered “Going Private” 
upon reading descriptions of the deal. 
  11wealthy individuals investors (e.g., Carl Icahn) or other unaffiliated investor groups. 
Table 1 shows that PE deals comprise 483 of the 657 deals, and constitute $800B of 
$850B of value in going private activity in 2000-2007. The MBO category is much 
smaller in total deal value and average deal size, and as PE activity has expanded in 
recent years the share of going private activity in the MBO category has fallen—
especially as management itself increasingly turns to private equity firms to help finance 
deals it originates. PE deals are approximately 8 times (mean) and 12.5 times (median) 
the size of take private transactions that are management-led. The 483 PE deals involve 
454 firm-years and 435 distinct firms, as competing bids and withdrawn bids are possible 
in our sample of announced transactions. These 454 firm-year observations on PE-backed 
deal announcements comprise our dependent variable of interest, i.e. PE Tx=1.   
 
Comparison of PE target versus all public firm characteristics . To explain 
the propensity of firms to be targeted in PE-backed going private offers, we compare 
firms that received a PE Tx offer to the population of all US public firms from which the 
take private transactions are drawn. We collected firm characteristics broadly relating to 
financial situation, ownership and governance structure, and network characteristics. Data 
on stock prices and company financials came from CRSP and Compustat. Institutional 
ownership data comes from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum 13F database, 
compiled from SEC filings of institutional money managers who control over $100M of 
13F securities. Data on ownership by insiders (officers and directors of the firm) come 
from Compact Disclosure.
4 We obtained information on corporate directors from the 
                                                 
4 One important limitation of the insider ownership data is that Compact Disclosure does not distinguish 
directors’ from executives’ holdings. We know only the total of insider holdings in the firm. 
  12Directors Database, which provides board composition data for public firms trading on 
the New York, American, and Nasdaq stock exchanges in 2000-2007.
5 In addition to 
directors’ identities, the database includes characteristics such as insider/outsider status, 
each director’s primary company affiliation and primary job title. Using this database, we 
construct variables such as board size, fraction of inside directors, CEO-chairman duality, 
and other board characteristics related to director attributes. The database also contains 
information on public firms’ top executives,
6 which we use to determine other positions 
held by directors.  
Table 2 shows differences in means and medians of basic attributes of the 
companies in the data broken out by whether or not firms have received a PE-backed take 
private offer. Differences between the PE and Public groups are significant for most of 
the financial variables, but the differences in measures of size become much less 
pronounced using median comparisons (i.e. for total capitalization and assets); this 
reflects the greater right skew of the size of public firms. Also, it appears that although 
PE firms are smaller, they have larger EBITDA and free cash flow, defined as (EBITDA-
interest-taxes-dividends). The PE and public samples also show very strong differences in 
ownership and board structure, with PE firms having higher institutional ownership, 
smaller boards, and a lower proportion of inside directors.  
 
Network measures. The Directors Database provides data on all public board 
memberships held by a director over the period 2000-2007. We are able to use this data 
                                                 
5 The Directors Database is the most comprehensive dataset on corporate directors, but it dates back only to 
the year 2000. Data availability rather than substantive considerations led to our choice of time period. 
6 Coverage of executives is somewhat inconsistent across firms, however, with no satisfactory answer from 
the data vendor on which executives get reported.   
  13to track directors across firms and over time to construct measures of director experience 
and of interlocking relationships between boards. We say a focal firm i is interlocked 
with firm j at time t ( ) 1 =
j
it Int  if there exists a director x on firm i at time t who either 
serves on the board of j or is an executive officer of j at time t’, for some t’ . This 
interlock measure is intended to capture connections a firm has with other companies via 
its board of directors. As we have constructed it, this is an asymmetric measure of 
interlock (different papers have used different definitions) because it is possible that 
 but   if linked director x is on the board of i but is a non-board executive 
of j. We do not limit interlocks to board-to-board relationships because we believe board 
members can derive sources of influence and information from other companies, either as 
directors or executives.  
t ≤
1 =
j
it Int 1 ≠
i
jt Int
Note as well that our definition of an interlock link leads to a stock variable, in 
that connections in the network need not be contemporaneous. We believe that this is the 
appropriate way to measure links because directors serving on boards in the present carry 
their previous learning, experience, and contacts with them to the boards on which they 
currently and subsequently serve.  
A firm’s Board Interlock measure is the firm’s total interlock count with other 
public firms, or  . Table 2 shows that the median public company is interlocked 
with five other firms. In comparison, the median firm receiving a PE-backed going 
private offer has eight interlocks. Table 3 Panel A shows the distribution of Board 
Interlock in 2007, and we see that only 10% of firms are “isolates”; all members of such 
firms’ boards appear only once in the Director’s Database. All other companies are 
∑
≠i j
j
it Int
  14connected to at least one other firm via its board interlock network. For future analysis, 
we also define an Interlock Dummy that equals 1 if Board Interlock>0, and 0 otherwise. 
We also consider network measures at the director (rather than firm) level. In the 
social networks literature the simplest measure of centrality is an agent’s degree score, 
which is the number of links involving the agent. In our case, a link is a director on firm i 
holding a director or executive position on firm j. Thus, analogous to our definition of 
board interlock, we define a director’s centrality to be the number of firms on which he 
has held a director or executive position, currently or in the past. Table 3 Panel B shows 
the distribution of Director Centrality among directors serving on boards in 2007. We can 
see that 58% of directors serve only one board; the remaining 42% create all of the 
linkages in the data. At the firm level, we can construct an average centrality measure 
from the centralities of the individual directors on each board. Table 2 shows that at the 
median public firm, the average director serves on the boards of 0.7 other firms.  
The variable of primary interest in our paper is “PE Link”—whether an “at risk” 
firm is interlocked through a shared director with another firm that in the past received a 
going private offer; we are interested in whether this relationship makes the firm more 
likely to itself receive a PE-backed take private offer. Formally,   if 
for some firm j and j received a going private offer in t’<t. Here, there are two 
things of note: the past transaction must strictly precede the year “at risk,” and we 
consider the broader sample of going private transactions (rather than only PE-backed 
ones) where the linked director could have acquired the prior transaction experience. 
Although we are specifically interested in the realization of PE-backed offers as the 
outcome variable (PE Tx), we believe general take private experience is valuable to 
1 = it Link PE
1 =
j
it Int
  15directors and can influence their attitude toward future take-private transactions, PE-
backed or otherwise.  
Table 4 shows the number of public firms that have identified interlock 
relationships with take-private targets in prior years, that is, have PE Link=1. However, a 
data truncation problem arises if we rely on the 2000-2007 Directors Database to 
construct our PE Link variable. Because PE Link=1 only if we are able to match one or 
more of a firm’s directors to a second firm that experienced a take-private offer in a 
preceding year, the PE Link variable in the earlier years of our sample is severely 
truncated. For example, for a public firm “at risk” in 2003, we identify the directors that 
sit on the board of the firm in 2003, and consider the other boards that they served on in 
2000, 2001, and 2002. If any of the firms that these directors served on in those years had 
received a going private proposal, then PE Link=1. This naturally means that firms at risk 
in the year 2000—the first in our dataset—cannot have identified links to going private 
deals, since we do not have data on director composition prior to that year.  
To alleviate this problem, we hand-collected data on all take-private transactions 
from 1995-1999 and obtained the directors that served on the boards of these companies 
in the year of the transaction using Compact Disclosure. Then we matched these directors 
to those in the Directors Database to identify all instances of interlocks between earlier 
(1995-1999) period going private transactions and active directors in the 2000-2007 
period. Table 4 shows that this addition makes a substantial difference in the earlier years 
of the sample, with 10% interlocks among all firms and 25% interlocks among firms 
receiving PE offers in 2000, which otherwise would be 0%. However, the monotonic 
increase in the proportion of interlocks from 2000-2007 still remains, and likely indicates 
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include year fixed effects, the major implication of this data truncation is that the effect of 
PE Link on propensity to receive private equity-backed going private proposals is less 
precisely estimated in the earlier years of the sample. However, it is also clear that the 
sample interlock average of 18% for all public firms and 34% for all firms receiving 
private equity-backed offers understates the true interlock rate for boards of directors. By 
2007, these percentages grow to 29% and 49%, respectively.  
Table 5 also gives additional characteristics of the PE Link variable. A firm-year 
can have PE Link=1 through the presence of one or more director who have experienced 
the same or multiple different prior deals. Panel A shows that 78% of PE Link=1 firm-
years are generated by a single link between the focal firm-year and a prior going private 
experience. Panel B shows that 94% of directors who “induce” PE Link=1 have only 
experienced a single deal; with a maximum of 3 deals experienced by 1% of involved 
directors, there are no directors who are disproportionately responsible for collecting and 
propagating PE experiences. This will become important later, as it does not appear that 
there exists a coterie of directors who are recruited to public firm boards because they are 
known to be friendly to PE-led take private transactions. 
 
3. Baseline Results 
 
Table 6 shows logit regression results of the probability of a firm becoming a PE-
backed target. Columns (2)-(4) of the table incorporate financial ratios and measures of 
equity ownership that have commonly been considered in the literature. In (2) we 
  17consider market-based variables such as market capitalization, market-to-book, and 
liquidity (share turnover), and find that, consistent with the literature, smaller, more 
undervalued, and less liquid firms are more likely to be PE targets. For a sense of 
economic magnitudes
7: a one standard deviation increase in the following covariates 
results in a (parentheses) decrease in the probability of becoming a target: size (23%), 
market-to-book (60%), and liquidity (25%). Column (3) includes measures of leverage 
and cash flow, but it is interesting to note that despite the prevalent practitioner concern 
over cash flow and debt capacity in private equity transactions, neither the debt to total 
capitalization ratio nor free cash flow consistently predict the likelihood of receiving a 
take private offer. This finding is consistent with prior research, and with the idea that ex 
ante leverage is not as relevant as post-deal leverage capacity. 
In (4) we add covariates related to firms’ equity ownership structure. We find that 
a 10 pt increase in institutional ownership raises the probability of a deal by 17%, while a 
10 pt increase in insider shareholdings raises the probability by 9%. The positive effects 
of these ownership variables could arise for a number of reasons. First, PE firms may be 
most attracted to firms with concentrated shareholder bases because mobilizing support 
for transactions involving firms with concentrated ownership is comparatively simple. 
Second, because executives of the company are typically bought out at a premium to the 
current market price and then (assuming their continued involvement with the firm) are 
reloaded with equity in the private company, insiders with large ownerships stakes may 
                                                 
7 Estimates of effects on outcome probability are based on coefficients in column (6), which will constitute 
our baseline specification.  Estimates of effects are calculated as follows: define odds(X) as p/(1-p)  where 
p is the outcome success probability evaluated at the vector of covariate values X. Then for a dxk change in 
covariate Xk with coefficient estimate bk,  exp(bk*dxk)=odds(X+ bk*dxk)/odds(X). Because in our sample 1-
p≈1, exp(bk*dxk) approximately gives the ratio of p evaluated at (X+ bk*dxk ) to p evaluated at X; or 
equivalently, the percent increase in the outcome success probability relative to baseline due to dxk.  
  18have a particularly strong incentive to secure PE-led bids. Third, large institutional 
owners—particularly those that are unsatisfied with a company’s management team and 
share price performance—often pressure directors and managers of the firm to consider a 
change of control transaction. 
Column (5) extends the baseline results to include board-level covariates. We find 
that a large board is negatively related to receiving a  PE offer, possibly due to 
coordination costs that may deter a PE offer or hinder decision-making. We also include 
an Interlock Dummy set equal to 1 if the at-risk firm has any interlocks, past or present, 
with other companies. We find that being connected to other firms increases the 
likelihood of PE offer by 61%. There are a number of possible interpretations of this 
result. First, by definition, interlocked directors have more public board experiences than 
do non-interlocked directors. Thus, they are likely to be perceived as professional by 
potential PE bidders. Transaction costs with experience boards in the take-private process 
are likely to be lowered, and members of the board itself may perceive a more 
straightforward process when experienced directors are on hand. Second, boards that are 
interlocked are privy to a greater amount of the information flow across the broader board 
network. We surmise that these interlocks increase the likelihood that a focal company 
will be directly networked to potential bidders. These factors are likely to positively 
stimulate PE interest in a company, and vice versa.  
Columns (6) includes basic controls for industry-level effects in the form of 
industry fixed effects defined at the Fama-French 48 level. Column (6) will constitute the 
baseline specification for analysis going forward.  
  19Turning to the PE Link measure, we find based on the column (6) point estimate 
that a company is 42 percent more likely to become a PE target when it has one or more 
directors that previously served on the board of a company that has attracted a take-
private offer. Based on the pattern of attenuation in the coefficient on PE Link across 
Columns (1)-(6) in the table, it is clear that the ownership structure covariates, general 
board characteristics, and industry effects do drive a meaningful amount of covariation 
between board interlocks to prior going private transactions and the probability of being 
targeted in a PE Tx. However, the PE Link effect remains statistically robust. Thus, if we 
view the Interlock Dummy as capturing the effect on PE Tx of generic connectedness to 
other firms, we can see that there is an additional effect of specific connectedness to take 
private offer-receiving firms on PE Tx, as captured by PE Link.
8 
 
4. Endogeneity Concerns 
 
Although the PE link is statistically robust, the question remains whether the 
effect should be interpreted as causal. We know from the sociology literature (e.g., Kono, 
Palmer, Friedland, and Zafonte 1998) that directors are not randomly placed onto boards. 
The presence of a PE deal-experienced director may be picking up correlation with 
predictors of PE deals not captured in the model. In the absence of a persuasive 
instrument for the presence of a PE-experienced director, there are two broad sources of 
                                                 
8 PE Link is not technically an interaction effect on Interlock Dummy, because construction of the PE Link 
variable uses supplemental data from 1995-1999 (as described in text). Thus, it is possible that Interlock 
Dummy (which is based only on 2000-07 directorships) =0 while PE Link=1 (if the link is with a prior 
transaction in, say, 1997). This, however, is the case in <1% of PE Link=1 observations; for the remaining 
observations PE Link=1 implies Interlock Dummy=1. If we do interpret PE Link as an interaction on 
Interlock Dummy, we estimate that PE Link, when considered jointly with the Interlock Dummy, actually 
then has an effect of increasing the likelihood of offer by ~130% relative to baseline.  
  20endogeneity we most worry about: 1) reverse causation, as board composition is 
manipulated by a management team eager to do a PE deal, and 2) director-firm matching 
on an omitted characteristic that determines board service and predicts PE Tx.  
First, there is the concern that because most of the recent private equity deals have 
been friendly, management is not only a willing participant but an active instigator. 
Management retained in the deal often are awarded generous option packages and large 
ownership stakes in the newly capitalized firm. Given these incentives, it is plausible that 
management plays an active role in shopping the company around to private equity firms, 
and likely can wield a great deal of influence in how attractive a target their company 
appears to a private equity firm. If a deal-friendly board is one such component, we may 
be concerned that the presence of deal-friendly or deal-experienced directors just reflects 
the influence of forward-thinking management. We will address this by examining the 
role of directors with various levels of tenure on the board, including those whose board 
service preceded their PE deal exposure in the interlocked firm. 
Second, there is a concern that directors and firms are matching on underlying 
characteristics   that are correlated with PE deal activity. Then the fact that a director 
previously matched with a firm that received a going private offer and also currently sits 
on a company’s board, suggests similarities between the past and current firm that would 
make the current firm more likely to receive a PE offer. We will address this concern in a 
number of ways. First, we control for what we believe to be the most likely potential 
correlates of PE activity, which include industry, geography, governance, and director 
attributes. To deal with the possibility that directors and firms are matching on more 
generic correlates of PE activity, we also construct a measure of susceptibility of the 
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proxy. Second, we explore the timing of PE Link activation within a firm, by exploiting 
the movement of directors across firms and also by using fixed effects. Lastly, we 
examine the effect of characteristics specific to the director who is responsible for the PE 
linkage—under the null that if the “PE Link” effect is due solely to matching then neither 
the influence of the director on the board nor the outcome of the director’s experience in 
a previous deal should have predictive power in the regressions.  
 
Management manipulation. In Table 7 we address the concern of reverse 
causation, that PE-experienced directors may be recruited to a firm by management in 
anticipation of doing a PE deal. In column (1), we consider only the effect of what we 
call “preexisting” directors. These are directors whose board service at the at-risk firm 
precedes their PE experience at a second firm in which they are directors or officers, and 
which activates the PE Link dummy for the focal firm. Alternately, “migrated” directors 
join the at-risk firm only after they acquired their PE experience. Migrated directors may 
be candidates who were specifically recruited by management looking to populate a PE-
friendly board, but this would not be the case for preexisting directors whose service on 
the focal board began before they obtained PE experience through board membership at a 
second company. If the PE Link effect is driven solely by migrated directors, the result 
could be interpreted as indicating that pro-PE company insiders attempt to actively build 
PE-friendly boards. 
We find that preexisting interlocks still predict the hazard of becoming a target. 
However, a shortcoming of this analysis is that we can only locate directors on boards of 
  22firms only back to 2000, due to limitations of the Directors Database. For example, if we 
know a director experienced a PE deal in Company A in 1997 (from our SDC supplement 
of 1995-1999 transactions), but this director appears in Company B in 2000 (from 
Directors Database which covers 2000-2007), this director is labeled “migrated” because 
we cannot verify that he served on Company B’s board prior to 1997. The result is that 
many directors are actually labeled “migrated” who in fact are likely “preexisting”; this 
we believe explains the marginal significance of results in column (1). 
Alternately, in columns (2)-(3) we consider only the PE Link effect of directors 
who have over 2 or over 3 years of tenure on the board. These directors are not recent 
recruits to the board, and hence likely are not specific hires for the purpose of facilitating 
a private equity deal. In column (2), for example, for a firm at risk in 2003, we only 
consider the effect of PE-experienced directors who have served on the board at least 
through 2002 and 2001. Again, because we only have directors data back to 2000, this 
regression only makes sense for observations in years  2002. This results in fewer 
observations overall relative to column (1), but here we consider the effect of 4,724 
tenured directors relative to the 3,352 preexisting directors in column (1). We find that 
interlocks of these tenured directors still predicts the likelihood of receiving a PE offer. 
Column (3) examines the effect of directors with 3 or more years of board service; results 
are also significant, although more marginal, which we attribute to fewer overall 
observations in the sample ( 2003 only) and fewer observations of such long-tenured 
directors.  
≥
≥
 
  23Director-firm matching. Even if management is not directly responsible for 
manipulating director composition in advance of a PE deal, we might be concerned that a 
director’s joint participation in a prior PE-involved firm and the current at-risk firm 
reflects some underlying similarities between the two firms that make them both more 
prone to take private offers. There are a few obvious candidates for omitted attributes that 
may determine both board service and private equity activity, such as industry, 
geography, firm governance characteristics, or director attributes/characteristics. We will 
consider these in turn in Table 8.  
Just as merger activity can occur in industry-specific waves, take-private activity 
may have an industry component as well. In addition, board service may reflect industry-
specific expertise. To eliminate the possibility that industry-specific relationships are 
driving the interlocks and the likelihood of receiving a take private offer, in column (1) 
we consider only the effect of PE Link where the interlocked firm belongs to a different 
industry from the focal firm. Such a link cannot reflect matching on industry-specific 
characteristics that would be predictive of within-industry private equity activity. But we 
find that PE Link here still strongly predicts the probability of becoming a target.  
In column (2), we control for the geographic proximity of the at-risk firm to all 
previous take private transactions. Here, the concern is that directors tend to serve on 
geographically proximate firms, and that such firms may share similar likelihood of take 
private activity (due to industry clustering, regional economic conditions, geographic 
focus of PE firms, etc). To address this issue, we compute, for every firm in each year, a 
PE geographic proximity variable that captures an “at risk” firm’s proximity to the 
volume of all prior PE activity. We define PE Proximity for firm i at time t as 
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, where j is a firm that receives a PE offer in t’<t, and d(i, j) is the physical 
distance between firms i and j.
9 This measure weights the contribution of each firm j 
experiencing a PE offer according to the inverse distance between the location of the PE 
target and the focal firm i. Summing these weighted contributions across all firms j 
produces a distance-weighted measure of the proximity of all PE activity to each focal 
firm i. The highest values of this variable are achieved for firms that are physically 
located nearest to the largest volume of prior take-private transactions. In column (2), 
however, we find no evidence of geographic clustering in PE targets; special proximity to 
past targets does not increase the predicted hazard of becoming a target and PE Link 
continues to hold.  
We may also be concerned that board service and take private activity may be 
correlated with governance characteristics—i.e. “lazy” directors are drawn to poorly 
governed firms, which then make ripe PE targets. We attempt to control for some basic 
measures of governance, including whether the CEO also holds the chairman role and the 
number of inside directors on the board—both of which reflect a lack of board 
independence.
10 However, column (3) shows that CEO-chairman duality does not predict 
                                                 
9 We calculate distance d(i,j) by locating firms in space according to their latitudes and longitudes. Using 
information available from the U.S. Postal Service, we assigned the longitude and latitude coordinates for 
the center point of every zip code to each firm lying within that zip code. Over small distances, one might 
use Euclid’s formula to compute the distance between two locations; however, the curvature of the earth 
seriously affects these calculations over areas as large as the continental United States. Thus, we calculated 
the distance between each set of points (A and B) using spherical geometry, using 
d(A,B) = 687.56 * {arccos[sin(lat A) * sin(lat B) + cos(lat A) * cos(lat B) * cos(Δ)]} 
where the units for latitude (lat) are radians, and Δ is the absolute value of the difference between the 
longitude of A and the longitude of B in radians. The constant, 687.56, converts the distance into units of 
five miles. 
10 Ideally we would have a governance measure comparable to the GIM measure; however, this is only 
available for S&P1500 firms which are large firms that tend not to be vulnerable as PE targets. 
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we would predict under a governance hypothesis; PE Link remains robust. 
In columns (4)-(5) we examine whether boards attract directors with a certain type 
of expertise, which may also be correlated with PE activity. In column (4) we find that 
the presence of financial experts
11 on a board—such as CFOs or VPs of Finance—is 
associated with a lower likelihood of a PE offer. One possible explanation for this effect 
is that boards with financially savvy directors may be better managed and leave less room 
for improvement by a private equity firm. Column (5) shows that the presence of 
financial investors
12—directors who serve as Managing Directors or General Partners of 
asset management firms—is associated with a higher likelihood of PE offer. This is 
consistent either with such directors steering the companies toward PE deals, or being 
invited to PE-leaning firms to share their expertise. We do not claim any causality in 
these director attributes; however the PE Link effect remains unaffected even after 
controlling for them. 
  Beyond these specific characteristics, we may wonder whether there is a general 
“PE Susceptibility” factor on which directors match to the boards they serve on—i.e. 
whether directors systematically match with companies with certain underlying 
susceptibilities to going private deals—which we should be controlling for in our 
regression. If there is a shared PE-susceptibility factor among interlocked firms, we 
should be able to construct the focal firm’s factor using the interlocked firms’ factors as a 
proxy. Thus we construct a measure of a focal firm’s PE-susceptibility by using the 
                                                 
11 These are directors whose job title at the company with which they are primarily affiliated contains the 
phrase “Finan.” 
12 These are directors whose job title contains the phrase “Managing Director” or “Partner,” or whose 
primary company name contains the phrase “capital ” “investment” “ venture” or “ asset” (note this is 
sensitive to use of spaces). 
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PE Susceptibility for firm i at time t as  ∑ =
j
jt
it
PETx pred
lock BoardInter
) 1 Pr(
1
, where j 
is a firm such that   and  1 =
j
it Int ) 1 Pr( = jt PETx pred is the predicted probability that the 
interlocked firm j receives a PE offer, which are the fitted values from the baseline logit 
model excluding PE Link. In column (6) we find that while there is evidence of director 
matching to firms with underlying susceptibility to PE deals, the PE Link measure is 
robust to this factor. 
  Timing of link activation. There are a few additional steps we can take to 
address the possibility that the PE Link effect is driven by director-firm matching. First, 
we can examine the timing of the “activation” of the PE Link within a firm and exploit 
the movement of directors across firms. In Table 9 column (1), we include a dummy 
variable Chosen Firm that  equals 1 for firm i if firm i at some point in time acquires a 
director who has PE experience. If the PE Link effect is due to matching, then conditional 
on being a firm that is chosen by a PE-experienced director, the timing of PE Link=1 
should not matter. However, we find that the firm-years that specifically have PE Link=1 
do strongly predict PE activity, even after controlling for the fact that this firm is a 
“Chosen Firm.”  
In column (2) of table 9, we track directors who leave a take private-offer-
receiving-firm pre-offer, to see whether other firms that they proceed to serve on have a 
higher likelihood of PE offer. If the PE Link effect is due to matching, then the fact that 
these directors once matched to firms that received a PE offer would suggest that the 
subsequent firms they match with also have a higher likelihood of PE offer; however, 
because they leave the firm prior to PE offer and do not actually experience the PE deal 
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construct a dummy variable Left Director that equals 1 if a firm-year has a director who 
left  a firm that later received a PE offer. We find that this variable is not significant in 
predicting PE activity, and that PE Link effect is still robust even after controlling for 
“Left Director.”  
  Finally, to exploit within-firm variation of PE Link activation, we estimate a fixed 
effects specification using a linear probability model. Since a fixed effects logit drops all 
groups with no within-group variation (~95% of the firm-years in our sample), we opt for 
a linear probability model. We find that inclusion of firm fixed effects in column (4) 
causes the PE Link estimate to increase (column (3) results without firm effects are 
shown as a comparison). This is actually consistent with the findings in columns (1), 
which seem to indicate that firms that PE-experienced directors serve on are actually 
poorer candidates for PE deals (perhaps because they are higher quality firms in ways 
unaccounted for by our observables). Taken together, the evidence suggests that the 
specific firm-years in which a PE-experienced director occupies the board has 
incremental explanatory power for likelihood of receiving a PE offer. 
Director-specific effects. In Table 10 we consider various characteristics specific 
to the director responsible for the interlock to determine whether the magnitude of the PE 
Link effect is sensitive to the influence or the experience of the director involved. If the 
PE Link effect does sensibly depend on measures of director influence, this would seem 
to refute the hypothesis that the results are driven simply by director-firm matching. In 
columns (1)-(3),  we consider interactions on PE Link where the PE Link director is a 
non-executive chairman, dual CEO-chair, and a retired director, respectively. The 
  28estimates are too noisy to yield statistical significance; however point estimates would 
suggest that an outsider chairman would wield substantial influence in deliberations over 
going private transactions whereas an insider chairman would not—this is fully 
consistent with standard practice of independent directors forming a special committee to 
negotiate transactions while insiders are sidelined. In addition, if the linked director is a 
retiree—i.e. no longer holds a position of power on a primary company—this would 
suggest that he is less influential on the board as well.  
In column (4) of table 10, we examine whether PE Link has a bigger effect in 
companies with less influential directors, as measured by the average centrality of the 
directors on board. “Low board centrality” is a dummy variable that =1 for firms whose 
directors fall in the lowest quartile of board network connectedness. The positive 
interaction effect (PE Link)*(Low board centrality) shows that having a PE-experienced 
director on board is especially conducive to PE offers in companies where the general 
profile of the board members is relatively low. In such cases, we hypothesize that the 
experienced director’s credentials will lead to his having relatively greater influence on 
the agenda and outcomes of boardroom deliberations.   
In columns (5)-(8) we explore the nature of the experience the PE Link director 
may have been imprinted by in the prior linked deal. In column (5) we consider interlocks 
to deals experienced by the PE Link director where the deal was withdrawn and never 
completed. In column (6) we consider interlocks to deals where the PE offer was received 
poorly by the market—where the announcement day returns of the deal were below the 
median of going private deal announcement day returns. Both capture instances where 
the director’s prior PE experience may have been a negative or unsuccessful one; and 
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This suggests that directors who have had prior negative experiences do not then go on to 
encourage subsequent firms to be receptive to private equity offers. In column (7) we 
consider PE Links by directors who were insiders in management-led buyouts in their 
prior PE experience. These directors substantially enhance the PE Link effect; we 
attribute this to the fact that their prior experience consists of an active initiation and 
management of a prior PE deal, in contrast to experienced directors who may have just 
played a sympathetic but supportive role. Lastly, it is interesting to consider PE Link 
effects of directors who were MBO insiders on deals that had low announcement day 
returns vs high announcement day returns. In contrast to directors who may find a high 
stock market reaction to a PE deal desirable (for reasons of fiduciary duty, etc.), an MBO 
insider would likely favor a low announcement day return because this means he gets to 
acquire the company cheaply. Column (8) shows that while a low announcement day 
return negates the effect of PE Link for a non-MBO insider, for an MBO insider the 
effect of having experienced a deal with low announcement day return is quite powerful 
in predicting the likelihood of PE offer in the current firm. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that directors carry forward their experiences from other firms, and 
use their influence within the board to affect outcomes.  
 
5. Further Analysis 
Lastly we try to address the concern that the results are driven by differences in 
firm characteristics of the PE Link=1 vs PE Link=0 samples. For instance, firms that 
have PE Links tend to be bigger and have larger boards, since such characteristics makes 
  30interlocking relationships with other companies more likely. However, we know from our 
baseline regressions that such characteristics are also correlated with the likelihood of 
becoming a PE target. If our baseline specification inadequately controls for such 
characteristics, then we might then be concerned that it is the differences in the 
distribution of such covariates between the PE Link=1 vs PE Link=0 samples that might 
be driving the results, and not the effect of the PE Link variable itself.
13 Ideally we would 
have two comparison samples that are comparable for all covariates but differ only one 
dimension, for PE Link.  
If we think of our PE Link variable as a treatment indicator, we can apply 
propensity score-based methods developed in the program evaluation literature to achieve 
covariate balance in the treatment and control samples (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; 
Hirano, Imbens and Ridder 2003). The propensity score, p(X), is defined as the 
probability of receiving treatment conditional on the covariates X, and is typically 
estimated as a logit of the treatment indicator on X. In Inverse Probability of Treatment 
Weighting (IPTW), treated and control observations are weighted by 1/p(X) and 1/(1-
p(X)), respectively, in the regression of interest. Intuitively, observations with 
characteristics that result in high likelihood of treatment, p(X), are down-weighted in the 
treatment group; similarly, observations with a low likelihood of treatment are down-
weighted in the control group. This procedure evens out differences in the covariates 
between the control and treatment groups. Imbens-Wooldridge (2007) also suggest 
trimming observations with p(X) outside of the interval [0.1, 0.9] to eliminate poor 
candidates for matching across the control and treatment samples. The regression on the 
                                                 
13 Although, bigger firms with bigger boards are less likely to become PE targets given our baseline 
estimates—so that it would likely not be these particular covariates that we would be concerned are driving 
the PE Link effect. 
  31weighted, trimmed sample then produces estimates of treatment effects independent of 
distributional differences in the initial control and treatment groups. 
Table 11 Panel A shows the differences in covariates between the PE Link=1 and 
PE Link=0 samples. Panel A1 shows substantial differences in means for all covariates in 
the initial sample. Panel A2 shows that after inverse-weighting and trimming, none of the 
differences are significant at conventional levels. Panel B column (2) then shows the 
regression results on this balanced sample; the results remain unchanged from our initial 
baseline specification. Despite substantial differences in the characteristics of firms that 
have versus lack PE-experienced directors, the IPTW method allows us to ascertain that 
those differences do not account for the PE Link effect. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  We have considered many alternative stories that might explain the relationship 
between having a director on board who has had take-private transaction experience and 
the likelihood of becoming a PE target. However, we find that the PE Link effect is quite 
robust. In addition, we find that the strength of this effect seems to vary with 
characteristics specific to the director responsible to the link, which is supportive of our 
causal interpretation of this PE Link effect.  
  The evidence we have presented suggests that boards do play an important role in 
private equity deal generation, particularly in the more recent deals characterized by 
friendly relations between offerers and targets. To the extent that directors are imprinted 
by experiences at other firms and have the power to influence their colleagues on the 
board, the board interlock network in which a firm is embedded will be relevant in the 
  32conversion of a potential target to an actual target. More generally, social networks are 
important feature of many financial transactions involving individual agents to entire 
firms. 
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  37Number of deals Total deal value ($MM)
Year PE MBO Other All PE MBO Other All
2000 54 25 14 93 23,998         2,310           10,037         36,345        
2001 24 21 10 55 4,558           986              2,302           7,846          
2002 27 23 8 58 9,020           2,571           383              11,974        
2003 49 20 5 74 7,570           524              294              8,388          
2004 36 12 2 50 31,384         447              5,011           36,842        
2005 70 5 7 82 66,601         1,522           1,278           69,401        
2006 105 11 3 119 290,726       14,218         404              305,348      
2007 118 6 2 126 366,825       2,497           4,405           373,727      
All years 483 123 51 657 800,682       25,076         24,114         849,872      
Mean deal value ($MM) Median deal value ($MM)
Year PE MBO Other All PE MBO Other All
2000 444            92              772            395            161              29                67                93               
2001 198            49              230            148            54                24                25                34               
2002 347            117            64              222            236              17                66                66               
2003 161            26              59              117            68                11                43                44               
2004 872            41              2,506         752            329              21                2,506           111             
2005 965            304            256            878            347              263              27                333             
2006 2,878         1,422         135            2,678         440              484              110              439             
2007 3,190         416            2,203         3,038         980              266              2,203           805             
All years 1,700         211            524            1,336         322              26                54                165             
Table 1. Going private transactions, 2000-2007
Data on going private transactions for firms trading on the NYSE, American, and Nasdaq stock exchanges, publicly announced between 
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2007. "PE" deals are transactions in which a private equity firm led the acquiring party or was identified as 
providing financing. "MBOs" are deals identified as management-led with no private equity involvement. "Other" includes offers made by other 
financial buyers (i.e. Carl Icahn, powerful families such as the Pritzkers of Chicago, etc.) PE Public
Mean Median Mean Median
Market statistics
Market capitalization ($MM) 1,164          
a 221              1,843          215          
Market to book 1.50            
a 1.22            
b 2.20            1.27         
Share liquidity 1.12            
a 0.80             1.39            0.81         
Company financials
Total capitalization ($MM) 1,772          
a 328              2,741          322          
Assets ($MM) 1,663          
a 330              3,941          331          
Sales ($MM) 1,055          
a 264             
b 1,901          165          
EBITDA ($MM) 169             
a 35               
b 341             21            
Free cash flow / Tot cap 0.02            
a 0.06            
b (0.00)           0.04         
Debt / Tot cap 0.26             0.19            
b 0.24            0.13         
Ownership / Governance structure
Insitutional ownership 0.48
a 0.49
b 0.36 0.30
Insider ownership 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.07
Board size 7.78
a 7.00
b 8.29 8.00
Inside directors (%) 0.20
a 0.17
b 0.23 0.20
Dual CEO-chairman 0.50 0.00 0.49 0.00
Network characteristics
Board interlocks 9.83
a 8.00
b 7.98 5.00
Avg board centrality 2.07
a 1.91
b 1.87 1.69
PE Link 0.34
a 0.00
b 0.18 0.00
Observations 454              50,117       
Table 2. Characteristics of private equity-backed target firms
This table compares the characteristics of all public firms in 2000-2007 receiving private equity-backed going private offers against firms 
that received no offers. Market-related statistics and company financials are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile by year. "a" 
indicates differences in mean between PE and Public firms are significant at 5%; "b" indicates that PE and Public sample distributions are
different at 5% significance level using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcox nonparametric test.# Interlocks Freq %
0 573 10%
1 to 2 772 14%
3 to 5 871 16%
6 to 10 1,163 21%
11 to 20 1,390 25%
21 to 30 546 10%
over 30 270 5%
All 5,585 100%
# Board 
seats
Freq %
1 23,022 58%
2 8,557 21%
3 to 5 6,754 17%
over 5 1,470 4%
All 39,803 100%
A. Distribution of Board 
Interlocks in 2007
B. Distribution of Director 
Centrality in 2007
Table 3. Distribution of network measures
Panel A shows the distribution of Board Interlocks among public firms in 2007. Panel B shows 
the distribution of Director Centrality among directors on public firms in 2007.A. All public firms B. Firms receiving PE offers
Year Interlocked
Not 
interlocked
All
% 
Interlocked
Interlocked
Not 
interlocked
All
% 
Interlocked
2000 766 6,729 7,495 10% 12 36 48 25%
2001 916 6,367 7,283 13% 6 18 24 25%
2002 1011 5,598 6,609 15% 7 18 25 28%
2003 1095 5,083 6,178 18% 12 36 48 25%
2004 1138 4,698 5,836 19% 9 26 35 26%
2005 1240 4,576 5,816 21% 25 40 65 38%
2006 1,378 4,391 5,769 24% 29 71 100 29%
2007 1,639 3,946 5,585 29% 53 56 109 49%
All years 9,183 41,388 50,571 18% 153 301 454 34%
Table 4. PE Link, by firm-year
Based on board composition data in 2000-2007 and our sample of going private transactions, we determine whether a company has an 
interlock with a firm that has in the past received a going private offer--i.e.. whether the company currently has a director serving on the 
board who previously served as a director or executive of another firm in the year that it received a going private offer. Panel A shows the 
number of interlocks for all the firm-years in the sample; Panel B shows the interlocks for the subset of firm-years in which PE offers are 
received.# Firms Freq %
1 7,180 78%
2 1,492 16%
3 397 4%
49 7 1 %
5 to 9 17 0%
All 9,183 100%
# Deals Freq %
1 1,763 94%
2 104 6%
31 4 1 %
All 1,881 100%
A. Distribution of distinct firms comprising 
each PE Link
B. Distribution of distinct deals experienced by 
each PE Link director
Table 5. Characteristics of PE Link
Panel A shows the distribution of distinct firms through which a director had prior PE experience at an at-risk firm-year with PE Link=1. 
Panel B shows the distribution of distinct deals experienced by a director who has prior PE experience.Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PE Link 0.656*** 0.767*** 0.763*** 0.528*** 0.501*** 0.354***
(0.104) (0.110) (0.110) (0.116) (0.114) (0.116)
Size -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.237*** -0.156*** -0.123***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.036) (0.043) (0.045)
Market to book -0.259*** -0.264*** -0.242*** -0.288*** -0.296***
(0.061) (0.070) (0.078) (0.089) (0.094)
Share liquidity -0.080** -0.079** -0.150*** -0.165*** -0.169***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.050) (0.053)
Debt ratio -0.065 0.184 0.371 0.342
(0.205) (0.222) (0.227) (0.234)
Free cash flow 0.059 0.124 0.146 0.112
(0.142) (0.176) (0.196) (0.169)
Institutional ownership 2.268*** 1.902*** 1.565***
(0.215) (0.222) (0.231)
Insider ownership 1.212*** 1.120*** 0.831***
(0.257) (0.256) (0.259)
Board size -0.112*** -0.077***
(0.024) (0.026)
Interlock Dummy 0.750*** 0.468**
(0.218) (0.223)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 50571 50470 50389 49107 47911 46470
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.12
Table 6. Effect of PE Link on private equity-backed going private offer
Table shows results of logit regressions where the independent variable =1 if a firm receives a private-equity backed 
going private offer. Observations are at the firm-year, and include public firms in 2000-2007. Regression (2) includes 
market-based controls, (3) includes measures of leverage and profitability, and (4) includes equity ownership 
controls. (5) includes board includes board characteristics, with General interlock dummy=1 if the company has any 
past or contemporaneous interlocks with other boards. (6) includes industry fixed effects (Fama-French 48). 
Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent, and are clustered at the firm level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Variable (1) (2) (3)
PE Link, preexisting directors 0.271*
(0.148)
PE Link, directors with >=2 yr tenure 0.351**
(0.137)
PE Link, directors with >=3 yr tenure 0.282*
(0.149)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
PE Link, =1 8501 6711 5779
  Tenured directors, =1 3352 4724 3410
  Tenured directors, =0 5149 1987 2369
Observations 46470 32146 26136
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.10
Table 7. PE Link effect of tenured directors
Table shows results of logit regressions where the independent variable =1 if a firm receives a private-
equity backed going private offer. Observations are at the firm-year. Regression (1) includes PE Link effects 
only for those directors whose service on the "at risk" firm preceded their PE experience; but directors for 
full sample of public firms are only observable for 2000-2007. (2) and (3) include PE Link effects for 
directors who sat on the board for the past 2 and 3 years, respectively, prior to the "at risk" year; 
regressions include observations through 2002 and 2003, respectively. Standard errors are Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent, and are clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PE Link 0.285** 0.339*** 0.344*** 0.337*** 0.340***
(0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116)
PE Link, diff industry only 0.304**
(0.120)
PE Proximity -0.002
(0.012)
Dual CEO-Chmn -0.082
(0.104)
# Inside directors -0.095*
(0.053)
# Finance experts -0.255**
(0.114)
# Financial investors 0.111**
(0.045)
PE Susceptibility 0.188**
(0.084)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46470 40753 46470 46470 46470 46470
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Table 8. PE Link effect, controlling for potential correlates of private equity activity
Table shows results of logit regressions where the independent variable =1 if a firm receives a private-equity backed going private 
offer. Observations are at the firm-year, and include public firms in 2000-2007. Regression (1) captures the effect of PE Link where 
the interlocks consist of companies in different Fama-French 48 industries.  (2) controls for the geographic proximity of previous 
private-equity-backed take private activity, by weighting each previous take private deal by its distance from the firm at risk. (3) 
controls for basic measures of corporate governance such as the whether the CEO is also the Chairman and the # of insiders on 
the board. (4)-(5) control for director attributes related to board composition, such as the # of finance experts and financial 
investors, respectively. (6) controls for a generic "PE Susceptibility" measure of the at-risk firm, constructed as the average 
predicted Pr(PE tx=1) of the firms interlocked with the at-risk firm. Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent, 
and are clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Variable Logit Logit OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PE Link 0.846*** 0.350*** 0.005*** 0.007**
(0.218) (0.116) (0.001) (0.003)
Chosen Firm -0.551***
(0.212)
Left Director 0.047
(0.139)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
Observations 46470 46470 47851 47851
Pseudo / Adj R2 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.01
Table 9. Timing of PE Link activation
Table shows results of regressions where the independent variable =1 if a firm receives a private-equity 
backed going private offer. Observations are at the firm-year, and include public firms in 2000-2007. 
Regression (1), Chosen firm =1 for firm i if firm i at some point in time acquires a PE-experienced director (i.e. 
has PE Link=1 for some t). In (2), Left director=1 if a firm i in year t has a director on board who left a firm pre-
offer (i.e. left a firm that would later receive a PE offer but did not stay to experience the offer). Regressions (3)-
(4) present OLS results, without and with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-
consistent, and are clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PE Link 0.308** 0.362*** 0.418*** 0.279** 0.468*** 0.574*** 0.340*** 0.573***
(0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.116) (0.134) (0.144) (0.117) (0.145)
  * (Non-executive Chmn) 0.368
(0.255)
  * (Dual CEO-Chmn) -0.136
(0.396)
  * (Retiree) -0.264
(0.218)
  * (Low board centrality) 1.070**
(0.468)
Low board centrality -0.444**
(0.226)
  * (Withdrawn offer) -0.279
(0.182)
  * (Low annc day return) -0.426** -0.452**
(0.178) (0.180)
  * (MBO insider) 0.953* 0.012
(0.522) (1.018)
  * (Low annc day return) * (MBO insider) 1.881*
(1.109)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46470 46470 46470 46470 46470 46470 46470 46470
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Director Experience Director Influence
Table 10. Director-specific PE Link effects
Table shows results of regressions where the independent variable =1 if a firm receives a private-equity backed going private offer. 
Observations are at the firm-year, and include public firms in 2000-2007. Regressions (1)-(3) characterize the director who is responsible 
for PE Link=1. Non-executive Chmn=1 if the PE Link is via a director who is the board chairman but is not a firm employee; Dual CEO-
Chm=1 if the PE Link is via a director who holds both the CEO and chairman titles in the firm; Retiree=1 if the PE Link is via a director 
who is retired from his primary job. In (4) Low board centrality=1 for firms whose directors fall in the lowest quartile of Average board 
centrality. Regressions (5)-(8) characterize the deals experienced by the PE Link director. Withdrawn offer=1 if the interlock is with a firm 
whose PE offer was withdrawn; Low annc day return=1 if the interlock is with a firm whose market return on the deal announcement day 
was below the median of PE deal announcement day returns; MBO insider=1 if the director was involved as an insider in an MBO in the 
prior linked deal. Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent, and are clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%A. Covariates for PE Link=1 vs PE Link=0 samples
Variable 1. Unweighted 2. Weighted
PE Link=1 PE Link=0 Diff T-stat PE Link=1 PE Link=0 Diff T-stat
Size 6.43 5.19 1.24 52.56 6.10 6.09 0.01 0.50
Market to book 2.13 2.21 -0.07 -1.97 2.11 2.13 -0.02 -0.62
Share liquidity 1.41 1.39 0.03 1.18 1.35 1.34 0.01 0.56
Debt ratio 0.23 0.24 -0.01 -2.89 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.50
Free cash flow 0.02 -0.01 0.03 7.14 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.75
Institutional ownership 0.52 0.32 0.20 60.38 0.47 0.47 0.00 1.00
Insider ownership 0.13 0.16 -0.03 -11.95 0.15 0.15 0.00 -1.08
Board size 9.09 8.10 1.00 27.61 8.83 8.80 0.03 0.95
Interlock Dummy 0.99 0.80 0.19 45.97 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.07
B. Inverse Probability of Treatment-Weighted regressions
Variable Baseline IPTW
(1) (2)
PE Link 0.354*** 0.360***
(0.116) (0.120)
Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 46470 31897
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.11
Table 11. Achieving covariate balance with propensity score-based weighting
Panel A compares the covariate means for the PE Link=1 and PE Link=0 samples, unweighted as in the original sample (Panel A1) and weighted 
using Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW), trimmed at propensity score values of [0.1,0.9] (Panel A2). Panel B shows regression 
results using IPTW. Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent, and are clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%`